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Charter Rights, State Expertise:
Testing State Claims to Expert
Knowledge
Emma Cunliffe*

I. INTRODUCTION
This article considers the individual and collective significance of two
decisions issued by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2018: Ewert v.
Canada1 and R. v. Gubbins.2 At first glance, these decisions appear to
have relatively little in common with one another. In Ewert, the Court
considered the accuracy of diagnostic and risk assessment tools used by
the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) when making decisions about
offenders. In Gubbins, the Court was concerned with pre-trial disclosure
rules regarding approved breath alcohol analyzers. Ewert and Gubbins
interpret different statutes and consider different Charter rights. The
cases reach different conclusions about whether the State had met its
responsibilities when dealing coercively with individuals in different
corners of the criminal legal system.
Both decisions, however, address the quality and impartiality of the
information used by the State when it engages in processes that deprive
individuals of liberty. When read together, Ewert and Gubbins raise
systemic questions about the adequacy and limits of judicial processes
that evaluate the quality of specialist knowledge generated by or for the
ends of coercive State institutions. By specialist knowledge, I refer to
techniques and practices that draw upon scientific principles or
*
Dr. Emma Cunliffe, Associate Professor, Allard School of Law, University of British
Columbia. Thank you to the editors and the anonymous referee for supplying very helpful
suggestions on an earlier draft, and to Osgoode Hall Law School for its long-standing commitment
to building a community of practice through the annual Constitutional Cases Conference. The
research that forms the basis for this article was supported by a SSHRC Insight Grant, “Women,
Violence and Expertise in Contemporary Canadian Legal Processes”.
1
[2018] S.C.J. No. 30, 2018 SCC 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ewert”].
2
[2018] S.C.J. No. 44, 2018 SCC 44 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gubbins”].
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systematic research, but that are specifically developed to address a
governance challenge. For example, risk assessment tools such as those
considered in Ewert were largely developed by psychiatrists and
psychologists working within state institutions using actuarial techniques
and psychiatric research.3 They respond to the challenges of predicting
recidivism and maintaining safety and security, within and beyond
coercive state institutions. Similarly, modern breath alcohol analyzers
operate through an automated analytical process that draws upon
principles of physics and chemistry. Since at least 1950, the development
and application of those methods has been motivated by the challenges
of detecting and prosecuting inebriated operators of vehicles.4 Access to
the data, software and other information necessary to study and monitor
these devices is carefully guarded by the companies, State regulators, and
law enforcement agencies who develop, approve and use them.
In focusing particularly on the reliability of specialist knowledge
generated within or for State institutions, I am responding to Shoshana
Pollack’s call — particularly to white settler academic researchers — to
eschew our tendency to focus on the behaviour and subject identity of
over-criminalized groups in favour of studying the work performed by
“state actors in the criminalization process”.5 Pollack argues that it is
productive to explore how processes such as racialization and the
classification of violence “function to shape and regulate social
marginality”, particularly within the criminal legal system.6 I am also
mindful of Rachel Roth’s observation that state power manifests
differently in different sites of governance and her argument that
analyses of state power should attend to conflicts and differences across
state institutions.7 When studying state practices of generating, applying
3
Eric Silver & Lisa Miller, “A Cautionary Note on the Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment
Tools for Social Control” (2002) 48 Crime & Delinquency 138-161.
4
A.W. Jones, “Fifty Years On: Looking Back at Developments in Methods of Blood and
Breath Alcohol Testing” (2000) Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Alcohol,
Drugs and Traffic Safety, T-2000 Stockholm 9 – 15; A.W. Jones, “Measuring Alcohol in Blood and
Breath: A Historical Overview” (1996) 8 Forensic Science Review 13-44.
5
Shoshana Pollack, “Therapeutic Programming as a Regulatory Practice in Women’s
Prisons” [hereinafter “Pollack, ‘Therapeutic Programmingʼ”] in Gillian Balfour and Elizabeth
Comack, eds., Criminalizing Women: Gender and (In)Justice in Neo-Liberal Times, 1st ed. (Halifax:
Fernwood Publishing, 2006), 236-49, at 246. As Jeffery Hewitt says, it is time to “flip the question”
— instead of studying Indigenous people and communities, study why the State keeps producing the
same result. Jeffery Hewitt, “Indigenous Research Methodologies”, paper presented at Canadian
Association of Law Teachers Conference, June 4, 2019.
6
Pollack, “Therapeutic Programming”, at 247-48.
7
Rachel Roth, “Searching for the State: Who Governs Prisoners’ Reproductive Rights?”
(2004) 11:3 Social Politics 411-438, at 417.
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and defending specialist knowledge, I take Roth’s caution that it is
important to attend to the specificity of institutional context and purpose.
In this article, I analyze Ewert and Gubbins against the context of,
respectively, evidentiary records regarding risk assessment algorithms
and breath alcohol analyzers. The premise that underlies my broader
research project is that focusing upon the relatively unexamined, routine
practices of state specialist knowledge may illuminate some of the ways
in which structural racism and gendered harms flourish within state
practices. As the Native Women’s Association and Canadian Association
of Elizabeth Fry Societies argued in their joint intervener factum in
Ewert, ostensibly neutral state practices can “have a disproportionately
negative effect on the most marginalized.”8 The analysis supplied by
these interveners suggested that, “[t]he multiplier effect of race and sex
creates a more clearly discriminatory impact [of apparently neutral state
practices] when it comes to federally sentenced Indigenous women.”9
However, the record in Ewert demonstrates the difficulties faced by
rights-holding litigants when they seek to unsettle the ostensible
neutrality of the State’s specialist knowledge.
Collectively, Ewert and Gubbins illuminate the relationship between
the work of generating an evidentiary record, burdens of proof, and the
practical value of constitutional rights. These two cases illustrate that the
Supreme Court of Canada’s (SCC) approach to Charter adjudication
places a demanding evidentiary burden upon rights holders who seek to
challenge the State’s specialist knowledge. They also suggest that the
Court has largely failed to grapple with the consequences of this
allocation for the practical value of constitutional rights.
In Part II, I describe Jeffrey Ewert’s challenge to the validity of
diagnostic and risk assessment tools that CSC uses when making
decisions such as security classification and recommendations regarding
parole. The SCC ultimately held that CSC had failed to meet its statutory
obligation to ensure that these tools are accurate when used for
Indigenous prisoners. However, Ewert failed to establish a breach of his
sections 7 and 15 rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.10 In Part III, I explore the judicial history of and reasoning in
Gubbins. The Court took the opportunity in this case to clarify the test
8
Native Women’s Association of Canada and Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry
Societies, Factum in Ewert v. Canada, S.C.C. file 37233, at para. 32.
9
Id., at para. 5.
10
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
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for first party disclosure, previously set out in R. v. Stinchcombe11 and
R. v. McNeil,12 and the relationship between first party and third party
disclosure.13 Part III reviews the approach set out in Rowe J.’s majority
reasons and the application of that approach to disclosure of maintenance
records for approved breath alcohol analyzers. I then turn to Côté J.’s
dissent in Gubbins, and the strong argument that she makes that the
Court should exercise caution when it is asked to change disclosure
standards on the basis of a sparse, largely state-generated evidentiary
record.
In Part IV, I consider the collective significance of Ewert and
Gubbins. Each of these cases represents a moment in a longer campaign
that is characterized by rights holders as seeking to hold the State
accountable for the quality of its specialist knowledge; and by state
actors as seeking to protect the State against frivolous or even vexatious
efforts to undermine evidence-based policies that promote public safety.
In this Part, I suggest that reading these two cases alongside one another
foregrounds questions and concerns about the work of generating an
evidentiary record that are largely overlooked within the majority
reasoning within the SCC decisions.

II. EWERT v. CANADA: CULTURAL BIAS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND RISK ASSESSMENT
Ewert v. Canada represents a significant milestone in Ewert’s 20-year
campaign to challenge CSC’s approach to risk assessment and
psychological assessment for Indigenous offenders. As Wagner J. (as he
then was) explained, CSC is entrusted with making significant decisions
about inmates:
the CSC must make numerous decisions about each inmate in its
custody. For example, it is required to assign a security classification of
maximum, medium or minimum to each inmate … . The CSC also
decides whether to recommend to the Parole Board of Canada whether
an inmate be released on parole.
If the CSC is to effectively assist in the rehabilitation of inmates while
ensuring the safety of other inmates and staff members and the
11

[1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Stinchcombe”].
[2009] S.C.J. No. 3, 2009 SCC 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “McNeil”].
13
R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“O’Connor”].
12
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protection of society as a whole, it must base its decisions about
inmates on sound information. This is explicitly recognized in s. 24(1)
of the CCRA,[14] which requires the CSC to ‘take all reasonable steps to
ensure that any information about an offender that it uses is as accurate,
up to date and complete as possible’.15

Ewert, a Métis man, challenged CSC’s institutional practice of relying on
diagnostic and risk assessment tools that have not been validated for
Indigenous offenders.16 Ewert’s challenge to the impugned tools was
advanced on several grounds. He contended that:
1. CSC had breached its obligation under section 24(1) of the CCRA by
failing to take all reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy of the impugned
tools when applied to Indigenous offenders;
2. CSC’s reliance on the impugned tools constituted an unjustified interference
with his section 7 Charter rights;
3. CSC’s reliance on the impugned tools constituted an unjustified interference
with his section 15 Charter rights.

The evidence at trial established that CSC had “long been aware of
concerns regarding the possibility of psychological and actuarial tools
exhibiting cultural bias.” In order to explain the significance of these
concerns, Ewert relied upon expert evidence from academic psychologist Dr.
Stephen Hart.17 Hart’s evidence was accepted by Phelan J. at trial and
ultimately proved important to Wagner J.’s reasoning. Hart defined “cultural
bias” as a phenomenon by which “the reliability or validity of an assessment
tool varies depending on the cultural background of the individual to whom
the tool is applied.”18 He defined validity as “a term of art in psychology that
refers to ‘the accuracy or meaningfulness of test scores’ [so] that ‘with
respect to a violence risk assessment tool, the accuracy would be the ability
of the test scores to forecast future violence’”.19
Hart testified that:
because of the significant cultural differences between Indigenous and
non-Indigenous Canadians, the impugned tools – which were
14

Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20 [hereinafter “CCRA”].
[2018] S.C.J. No. 30, 2018 SCC 30, at paras. 2-4 (S.C.C.).
16
Ewert v. Canada, [2018] S.C.J. No. 30, 2018 SCC 30, at para. 49 (S.C.C.).
17
Hart’s testimony was based upon his peer-reviewed scholarly work. See, e.g., Stephen
Hart, Christine Michie and David J. Cook, “Precision of Actuarial Risk Assessment Instruments:
Evaluating the ‘Margins of Error’ of Group v. Individual Predictions of Violence” (2007) 190
British Journal of Psychiatry 60-65.
18
Ewert v. Canada, [2018] S.C.J. No 30, 2018 SCC 30, at para. 13 (S.C.C.).
19
Id., at para. 44, citing trial testimony, Dr. Stephen Hart.
15
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developed for and validated by studies on predominantly nonIndigenous populations – [were] more likely than not to be crossculturally variant in some degree when applied to Indigenous
individuals.20

However, it was not possible to state in the absence of research whether the
degree of variance was large or small.21 The trial judge accepted this
testimony and this information proved significant in Wagner J.’s reasoning.
This article considers the quality of specialist knowledge that is
generated and relied upon by the State to guide coercive interactions with
individuals, while also attending to legal mechanisms for evaluating that
specialist knowledge when it becomes expert opinion evidence. In Ewert,
Canada called psychologist Dr. Marnie Rice to give evidence about the
validity of the impugned psychological and risk assessment tools with
respect to Indigenous offenders. Rice spent much of her career as
a researcher and clinician in a forensic psychiatric facility. She
co-developed two of the risk assessment tools Ewert challenged.22 The
essential thrust of her testimony was “that the impugned tools are valid
and are not affected by cultural bias with respect to Indigenous
offenders.”23
Justice Wagner largely passed over the trial judge’s finding with
respect to Rice’s expert evidence, stating only that the trial judge found
her evidence “of little assistance and [that it] could not be relied upon,
except where it was consistent with that of Dr Hart.”24 The trial judgment
provided more information about Rice’s evidence. Justice Phelan was
very critical of Rice’s work.25 For example:
[Dr Rice] failed to disclose in her Report as required by s 3(k) of the
Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses that she was one of the authors
of the VRAG and SORAG manuals. She was aware of this disclosure
requirement.
…
20

Id., at para. 13.
Id.
22
See V.L. Quinsey et al., Violent Offenders: Appraising and Managing Risk (Washington
DC: American Psychological Association, 2d ed. 2006; 3d ed. 2015) (2d ed. re Violence Risk
Appraisal Guide and Sexual Offender Risk Appraisal Guide which applied at the time relevant to
Ewert’s case; 3d ed. re Violence Risk Appraisal Guide – Revised and Sex Offender Risk Appraisal
Guide – Revised).
23
Ewert v. Canada, [2018] S.C.J. No 30, 2018 SCC 30, at para. 15 (S.C.C.).
24
Id.
25
Ewert v. Canada (Correctional Service), [2015] F.C.J. No. 1123, 2015 FC 1093 (F.C.).
21
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In the end, Dr. Rice’s evidence was of little assistance, particularly to
the Defendant [Canada]. It is unnecessary to quote some of Dr. Rice’s
more controversial statements about the political reasons behind the use
of scientific tests. However, it was her view that the test scores are
reliable and immutable. She eschewed the various rehabilitation
programs run by CSC as distractions or something akin to giving
prisoners something to do while in prison. In that regard, her evidence
and central thesis runs contrary to the statutory purpose and the
operational goals of CSC.26

The trial judge also criticized Rice for what he characterized as her
“selective reliance” on academic studies of the predictive value of the
impugned tools, including studies of questionable validity.27 In short, in
the assessment of this trial judge, the State’s only expert evidence
addressing the accuracy of the impugned tools was seriously deficient
across a number of important measures — including independence and
reliability. Indeed, the trial judge implied that he considered excluding
Rice’s evidence pursuant to White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott &
Haliburton,28 but noted: “...[h]ad her evidence been struck, the
Defendant would have had no expert evidence before this Court.”29
Justice Phelan’s insinuation that the State’s expert evidence on the
central question in the Ewert litigation was so deficient that it courted
inadmissibility should in itself be cause for concern about the State’s
capacity for principled, evidence-based decision-making in an
adversarial context. However, the evidentiary record in Ewert also hints
at a deeper story about how coercive State institutions generate and use
specialist knowledge. As noted above, the trial judge concluded that Rice
— who co-developed two of the impugned tools — gave evidence that
ran “contrary to the statutory purpose” of CSC. The tools that Rice
helped to develop are widely used, not just within corrections but also for
sentencing and particularly with respect to dangerous offender and longterm offender applications. Judges frequently characterize them as
accurate and objective predictors of risks of recidivism.30 In Ewert, the
26

Id., at paras. 45, 47.
Id., at paras. 49-51.
28
[2015] S.C.J. No. 23, 2015 SCC 23 (S.C.C.).
29
Ewert v. Canada, [2015] F.C.J. No. 1123, 2015 FC 1093, at para. 46 (F.C.).
30
See, e.g., R. v. Veysey, [2010] O.J. No. 2737, 2010 ONSC 3704, at para. 56 (Ont. S.C.J.);
R. v. Hogg, [2009] O.J. No. 397, 2009 CanLII 2919, at para. 39 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. G.W., [2002] O.J.
No. 5317, 2002 CanLII 2669, at para. 6 (Ont. S.C.J.). Compare R. v. D.A.L., [2014] B.C.J. No. 2513,
2014 BCSC 1854 (B.C.S.C.), for a more detailed judicial consideration of the reliability of
algorithmic risk assessment and diagnostic tools.
27
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trial judge found that these tools are not validated for Indigenous people,
who are vastly over-represented within coercive state institutions and for
whom coercive state institutions are disproportionately likely to produce
adverse outcomes. Furthermore, the trial judge concluded that an author
of two of these tools held a perspective on rehabilitation that ran counter
to the statutory purposes of the corrections system.
The trial judge held that CSC had indeed breached its statutory
obligation under section 24(1) of the CCRA by failing to take reasonable
steps to ensure the validity of the impugned tools.31 He also held that this
reliance upon the impugned tools breached Ewert’s section 7 Charter
rights because it adversely impacted his liberty and security interests in a
manner that was arbitrary and overbroad.32 Ewert had also argued that
the court should recognize a new principle of fundamental justice: “the
contravention of an express statutory direction may constitute a breach of
fundamental justice.” Justice Phelan held that it was unnecessary to
address this “interesting” argument.33 Finally, Phelan J. held that the
evidentiary record was insufficient to permit him “to usefully engage in
the nuanced analysis called for in s. 15” of the Charter.34
A majority of the S.C.C. upheld Phelan J.’s conclusions that CSC had
breached its statutory obligation35 and that Ewert had failed to prove a
breach of his section 15 Charter equality rights.36 However, Wagner J.
reversed Phelan J. on the question of whether CSC’s reliance on the
impugned tools breached section 7 of the Charter. Justice Wagner held
that while the CSC’s unqualified reliance upon the impugned tools was
“troubling”, “the onus was upon Mr Ewert to prove that CSC’s impugned
practice was arbitrary or overbroad; he has not done so in this case.”37
Ewert’s claim succeeded because a majority of the SCC held that the
obligation set out in section 24(1) of the CCRA (to take all reasonable
steps to ensure the accuracy of information used in respect of an
offender) applies to CSC’s use of the impugned tools.38 Justice Wagner
31
Ewert v. Canada, [2015] F.C.J. No. 1123, 2015 FC 1093 at paras. 81-85 (F.C.)
[hereinafter “Ewert (F.C.)”].
32
Id., at paras. 97-105.
33
Id., at paras. 107-108. Justice Wagner characterized this as an argument for a new
principle of fundamental justice ‘that the state must obey the law’, Ewert v. Canada, [2018] S.C.J.
No 30, 2018 SCC 30, at para. 20 (S.C.C.).
34
Ewert (F.C.), id., at para. 109. This conclusion was characterized by the SCC as a finding
that Ewert had failed to prove a breach of s. 15. Ewert, id., at paras. 20-21.
35
Ewert, id., at para. 67.
36
Id., at para. 79.
37
Id., at para. 74.
38
Id., at para. 45.
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provided a detailed analysis of the statutory language, context and
purpose of section 24(1) to justify this conclusion. The conclusion that
the statutory obligation in section 24(1) governs CSC’s use of risk
assessment and psychological evaluation tools led him, in turn, to
consider whether CSC had discharged this responsibility. In this portion
of his analysis, Wagner J. held that CSC’s responsibilities were informed
by section 4(g) of the CCRA, which provides that the principles that
guide CSC in achieving its statutory purpose include:
(g) correctional policies, programs and practices respect gender, ethnic,
cultural and linguistic differences and are responsive to the special
needs of women, aboriginal peoples, persons requiring mental health
care and other groups... .

Noting that Ewert marked the first occasion on which the SCC had
interpreted section 4(g), Wagner J. held:
the principle set out in s. 4(g) of the CCRA can only be understood as a
direction from Parliament to the CSC to advance substantive equality
in correctional outcomes for, among others, Indigenous offenders.
Section 4(g) represents an acknowledgement of the systemic
discrimination faced by Indigenous offenders in the Canadian
correctional system. This is a long-standing concern and one that has
become more, not less, pressing since s. 4(g) was enacted. In these
circumstances, it is critical that the CSC give meaningful effect to
s. 4(g) in performing all of its functions. In the context of the present
case, giving meaningful effect to s. 4(g) means, at a minimum,
addressing the long-standing and credible concern that continuing to
use the impugned [tools] in evaluating Indigenous inmates perpetuates
discrimination and contributes to the disparity in correctional
outcomes between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders.39

Justice Wagner identified that the legislative history supported his
conclusion that section 4(g) was enacted to pursue substantive equality in
correctional outcomes.40 The widening gap in correctional outcomes
demonstrated the continuing importance of this principle.41 Accordingly,
the failure to take “reasonable steps” to ensure that the impugned tools
are valid — or, if necessary, to make them so — constituted a breach of
CSC’s statutory duty under section 24(1) of the CCRA. Justice Wagner
observed:
39
40
41

Id., at para. 53 (emphasis added).
Id., at paras. 55-59.
Id., at para. 60.
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Although this Court is not now in a position to define with precision
what the CSC must do to meet the standard set out in s. 24(1) in these
circumstances, what is required, at a minimum, is that if the CSC
wishes to continue to use the impugned tools, it must conduct research
into whether and to what extent they are subject to cross-cultural
variance when applied to Indigenous offenders. Any further action the
standard requires will depend on the outcome of that research.42

The SCC declared that the CSC had breached its statutory obligation
under section 24(1).43 Emphasizing that such a declaration is both
discretionary and exceptional, Wagner J. held that it was nonetheless
appropriate in the context of this case. The majority decision records that
Ewert commenced his first grievance against the use of the impugned
tools in April 2000 and that his grievance was first judicially reviewed by
the Federal Court in 2007 and by the Federal Court of Appeal in 2008. At
that time, CSC assured the Court that “it was reviewing its intake
assessment tools used for Indigenous offenders” and this assurance was
an important factor in the original dismissal of Ewert’s complaint.44
However, Wagner J. observes, the trial judge found in 2015 “that there
was no evidence that the CSC had ever completed the research referred
to by the Federal Court in 2007 and anticipated by the Federal Court of
Appeal in 2008”.45 Given that almost two decades had now passed since
Ewert filed his original grievance, Wagner J. held that he should not be
required to renew that grievance to determine whether the statute had
been breached. This declaration did not invalidate any decision made by
CSC, including any decision made in reliance on the impugned tools.46
Justice Wagner held that the assessment of any such decision would be
left to future applications for judicial review.

III. R. v. GUBBINS: ASSESSING THE RELIABILITY OF
BREATH ALCOHOL ANALYZERS
When Gubbins was heard before the Alberta Court of Appeal,
Slatter J.A. observed: “since 2012 there has been considerable
uncertainty and inconsistency in trial court decisions on the obligation
of the Crown to disclose maintenance records for breathalyzer
42
43
44
45
46

Id., at para. 67.
Id., at para. 80.
Id., at para. 85.
Id., at para. 86.
Id., at para. 88.
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instruments.”47 Justice Slatter details some of the judicial history to this
state of uncertainty, before explaining that Gubbins and its companion
case Vallentgoed “were developed, at least in part, as test cases.”48
When these cases came to the SCC, Rowe J.49 took the opportunity to
clarify the test for first party disclosure and the relationship between
first- and third party disclosure in criminal cases. Justice Côté wrote a
heated dissent that accepted Rowe J.’s statement of the law regarding
disclosure but disagreed with how the legal principles should be
applied in these cases. Each of these sets of reasons identified the 2012
SCC decision in R. v. St-Onge Lamoureux50 as a case that provided
important context for the dispute regarding the disclosure of
maintenance records. In this part, I will set out the SCC’s approach to
first and third party disclosure, before turning to its analysis of the
relevance of maintenance records.
The section 7 Charter right of an accused to receive disclosure from
the Crown upon request was first recognized in R. v. Stinchcombe.51
Justice Sopinka referenced the Royal Commission on the Donald
Marshall Jr Prosecution when he observed that “... [r]ecent events have
demonstrated that the erosion of this right due to non-disclosure was an
important factor in the conviction and incarceration of an innocent
person.”52 Stinchcombe imposed a duty on the prosecutor to disclose
“all relevant, non-privileged information in its possession or control,
whether inculpatory or exculpatory.”53 This obligation applies to all
non-privileged information in the Crown’s possession, even where the
Crown does not propose to adduce that information and whether
favourable to the accused or not.54 In a much-cited passage, Sopinka J.
explained,
the fruits of the investigation which are in the possession of counsel for
the Crown are not the property of the Crown for use in securing a

47
R. v. Vallentgoed, [2016] A.J. No. 1180, 2016 ABCA 358, at para. 2 (Alta. C.A.)
[hereinafter “Vallentgoed”].
48
Id.
49
Majority per Rowe J. with Wagner C.J.C., Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Gascon,
Brown and Martin JJ., Côté J. dissenting.
50
[2012] S.C.J. No. 57, 2012 SCC 57 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “St-Onge Lamoureux”].
51
[1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Stinchcombe”].
52
Id., at 336, citing Nova Scotia, Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr,
Prosecution Vol. 1 “Findings and Recommendations” (Halifax: The Commission, 1989).
53
R. v. Gubbins, [2018] S.C.J. No. 44, 2018 SCC 44, at para. 18 (S.C.C.).
54
R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, at 338-39.
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conviction but the property of the public to be used to ensure that
justice is done.55

In the years since Stinchcombe was decided, the duty to make disclosure
has been clarified a number of times.56 Perhaps most significantly for
present purposes, McNeil explains that the obligation to make disclosure
rests upon the Crown prosecutor, not police or other State
representatives. However, a prosecutor “who is put on notice of the
existence of relevant information” held by other Crown agencies or
departments must inquire further and obtain “the information if it is
reasonably feasible to do so.”57 “[T]he police have a corollary duty to
disclose to the prosecuting Crown all material pertaining to the
investigation of an accused.”58 In McNeil, the SCC considered whether
first party disclosure extended to police records regarding police
misconduct. The Court held that “where the disciplinary information is
relevant, it should form part of the first party disclosure package, and its
discovery should not be left to happenstance.”59 This duty arises whether
or not police misconduct is directly related to the investigation in which
the accused is implicated.
I read McNeil as a very clear statement that the duty to disclose
records arises where those records are obviously relevant, regardless of
whether or not the information arose out of the investigation that led to
charges being laid against the accused. However, confusion had crept
into the jurisprudence, with some courts seeming to hold that the duty of
first party disclosure extended only to the “fruits of the investigation”
and others using relevance as the touchstone. Accordingly, in Gubbins,
the SCC seized the opportunity to clarify the scope of first party
disclosure. Justice Rowe suggested that the duty to make first party
disclosure operates through a two-part analysis. First:
[t]he ‘fruits of the investigation’ refers to the police’s investigative files,
as opposed to operational records or background information. This
information is generated or acquired during or as a result of the specific
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information into the charges against the accused. Such information is
necessarily captured by first party/Stinchcombe disclosure.60

Justice Rowe cited the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in R. v.
Jackson61 to explain that information generated in the course of the
investigation “may relate to the unfolding of the narrative of material
events, to the credibility of witnesses or the reliability of evidence that
may form part of the case to meet.”62 All of this information, to the
extent that it is not privileged, must be disclosed.
Secondly, Rowe J. held that in “addition to information contained in
the investigative file, the police should disclose to the prosecuting Crown
any additional information that is ‘obviously relevant’ to the accused’s
case.”63 Justice Rowe explained that the phrase “obviously relevant”
does not indicate “a new standard or degree of relevance.” Instead,
this phrase simply describes information that is not within the
investigative file, but that would nonetheless be required to be
disclosed under Stinchcombe because it relates to the accused’s ability
to meet the Crown’s case, raise a defence, or otherwise consider the
conduct of the defence.64

Therefore, affirming McNeil, information which is not part of the “fruits
of the investigation” but which is relevant to the accused’s right to make
full answer and defence must also be given by police to the prosecutor,
and (to the extent that it is not privileged) disclosed by the prosecutor to
the defence. Where the prosecutor refuses to disclose evidence because it
is irrelevant, the burden is on the prosecutor to demonstrate that the
information is “clearly irrelevant”.65
When information is held by a state agency including police, third
party disclosure processes may still be important if that information is
neither part of the fruits of the investigation nor obviously relevant to the
accused person’s case.66 In order to obtain third party disclosure, an
accused must apply to court for an order requiring production to the
court. In this instance, the accused bears the burden of showing that the
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R. v. Gubbins, [2018] S.C.J. No. 44, 2018 SCC 44, at para. 22 (S.C.C.).
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Id., at paras. 92-93, cited in R. v. Gubbins, [2018] S.C.J. No. 44, 2018 SCC 44, at para. 22 (S.C.C.).
63
Gubbins, id., at para. 23.
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Gubbins, id., at para. 19.
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Gubbins, id., at para. 24; R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.).
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record is “likely relevant” to the proceeding against him or her.67 Where
the accused meets that threshold, the judge will examine the records to
decide whether the record is actually relevant, and to weigh competing
interests.68 The third party disclosure regime is intended to prevent
fishing expeditions and to protect third party privacy and equality rights,
among other values, but the SCC has emphasized that likely relevance
should be given “a wide and generous connotation” that “includes
information in respect of which there is a reasonable possibility that it
may assist the accused in the right to make full answer and defence.”69
In the post-Gubbins Ontario Court of Appeal decision R. v. Stipo,70
Watt J.A. usefully explained that in order to be “obviously relevant” for
first party disclosure, “the relevance of the records must be ‘obvious’
without” the judicial examination contemplated in the second step of the
O’Connor process.71 However, in the absence of statutory principles to
the contrary, “any evidence that has a tendency to cast doubt on the
reliability of” the State’s expert evidence is obviously relevant and
should be shared as part of the first party disclosure.72
Having clarified the relationship between “the fruits of the
investigation”, “obvious relevance” and “likely relevance”, Gubbins
addresses the question of whether maintenance records for approved
breath alcohol analyzers should be disclosed at all; and if so, under
which regime. It is here that the distinctive legislative context for breath
alcohol analyzers, the associated case law, and the history of policymaking in this area, become important.
Section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code73 provides that evidence of
the results of a breath sample taken with an ‟approved instrument”
constitute, under certain circumstances, “conclusive proof of the
concentration of alcohol in the accused person’s blood” at relevant
times.74 This statutory presumption limits how the reliability of the result
recorded by an approved breath alcohol analyzer may be challenged. An
“approved instrument” is defined in section 254(1) (repealed by S.C.
67
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2018, c. 21, s. 21, effective December 18, 2018; and now in s. 320.11) to
mean a breath alcohol analyzer which is approved by the Attorney General
of Canada as suitable for the purpose of section 258. In this article, I refer
to devices that are “approved instruments” under section 254 (currently
under section 320.11) as approved breath alcohol analyzers. (The
commonly used terms “Breathalyzer” and “Intoxilyzer” are brand names
for particular analyzers.)
The Attorney General of Canada has appointed the Alcohol Test
Committee of the Canadian Society of Forensic Science (ATC) to
evaluate breath alcohol analyzers and recommend whether they should
be approved under section 254 (currently under section 320.11) of the
Code.75 ATC publications position ATC as a scientific body:
the determination of blood alcohol concentrations (BACs) by means of
breath tests is a scientific process and, for that reason, must be
performed according to proper scientific practices and standards
established by scientists with specific knowledge of the subject.76

The ATC publications that I have reviewed do not specify what training
or credentials are required in order to be a member of that Committee.
Hodgson reported in 2012 that the ATC include “individuals who
possessed a scientific background of at least an undergraduate science
degree from a recognized university.”77 A search for the credentials of
past and present members suggests that some hold doctorates in
toxicology, although doctorate degrees are not universal among those
members I could find, and I could not find information about the
qualifications of some members.
In her dissenting opinion in Gubbins, Côté J. cast further light on the
composition of the ATC.78 She adopted the following passage from R. v.
Sutton:
the [ATC] is not a truly independent body of scientific experts who
offer purely objective opinions on topics relating to breath testing
instruments. The [ATC] is comprised of scientists who have direct
connections with, and are employed by, policing services and
75
Brian T. Hodgson, “The Validity of Evidential Breath Alcohol Testing” (2013) 41
Canadian Society of Forensic Science Journal 83-96, at 87-88.
76
Canadian Society of Forensic Science Alcohol Test Committee, Recommended Best
Practices for a Breath Alcohol Testing Program (CSFS, December 2018), online:
<https://www.csfs.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/2018-12-18-Best-Practices.pdf>.
77
Brian T. Hodgson, “The Validity of Evidential Breath Alcohol Testing” (2013) 41
Canadian Society of Forensic Science Journal 83-96, at 87-88.
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R. v. Gubbins, [2018] S.C.J. No. 44, 2018 SCC 44, at para. 75 (S.C.C.).
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Government Agencies. Five of the ten members of the [ATC] are
employed by RCMP labs across the country. Four of the remaining five
members are employed by Government agencies.79

Justice Côté suggested that, given this composition, courts should be
cautious about determining scientific questions that arise with respect to
the reliability of breath-testing programs solely on the basis of evidence
from the ATC.80 She pointed to instances, both in litigation and in
legislative debates, where claims made by ATC members had been
contested by other reputable experts.81
Policy efforts to reduce the harms of intoxicated driving have focused
on developing (and refining) breath alcohol analyzers to reliably produce
accurate results under realistic operating conditions.82 In Gubbins, Rowe J.
described how a contemporary device operates, emphasizing that the
device will “perform internal and external diagnostic tests at the time each
breath sample is taken in order to ensure accuracy of the results.”83
Broadly speaking, breath alcohol analyzers cycle through control
procedures before and after taking the true breath sample to ensure
accuracy.84 These control procedures test the ambient air and samples of
known alcohol concentration, and purge the device of vapour that could
affect the results. Each step in these procedures generates a printed record.
In St-Onge Lamoureux, a majority of the Court held that the statutory
presumptions in section 258(1)(c), (d.01) and (d.1) infringe section 11(d)
of the Charter, but that this infringement is demonstrably justified after
severance of certain words from section 258(1)(c).85 Justice Deschamps
held that the purpose of these statutory presumptions is “to give the
results [recorded by approved breath alcohol analyzers] a weight
consistent with their scientific value.”86 She held that information before
Parliament when it passed these provisions and the evidence adduced in
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Id., at paras. 76-80.
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St-Onge Lamoureux established that this was a pressing and substantial
objective.87
In the wake of St-Onge Lamoureux, a dispute over disclosure of
maintenance records played out across Canada. Broadly speaking, Crown
prosecutors in many jurisdictions resisted disclosing maintenance records
on the premise that they are not relevant to the accuracy of the results
obtained using breath alcohol analyzers. Defence counsel pointed to the
language of the Criminal Code and St-Onge Lamoureux (both discussed
in more detail below) to support the argument that maintenance records
can be significant to the statutorily relevant question whether a breath
alcohol analyzer malfunctioned. Perhaps the clearest articulation of the
position that maintenance records are relevant to the defence in an “Over
80” case came from Paciocco J. (as he then was) in R. v. Fitts.88 Judge
Paciocco held:
[such records are] created and preserved to enhance the accuracy of the
breath testing program so that the performance of approved instruments
in accurately securing blood alcohol readings is known. This
information is therefore about the reliability of results. It strikes me
that, logically, accuracy verifying information derived from the very
machine being relied upon by the Crown to generate ‘conclusive’
evidence of the subject’s blood alcohol content is prima facie relevant.
…
[Pursuant to the language of section 258(1)(c) of the Code], ‘clear
irrelevance’ is not demonstrated by showing that the contested
information does not bear on the accuracy of the results. It is
demonstrated by showing that the information has nothing to do with
whether the machine was ‘malfunctioning or operated improperly.’89

In short, Paciocco J. drew a line from information that documented the
performance of approved instruments over time to the statutorily relevant
consideration of whether the machine was malfunctioning at a given
time. However, Paciocco J. expressed dissatisfaction with this result,
observing that if maintenance records indeed have no bearing on the
87
Id. Specifically, testimony in committee and speeches made in Parliament identify a
significant problem with the Carter defence (R. v. Carter, [1985] O.J. No. 1390, 7 O.A.C. 344 (Ont.
C.A.)), in which an accused was able to rebut the presumption of accuracy by giving testimony
about his or her alcohol consumption and supplying toxicology evidence that suggested a “true”
blood-alcohol content based on self-reported consumption. See also, R. v. Dineley, [2012] S.C.J. No.
58, 2012 SCC 58 (S.C.C.).
88
[2015] O.J. No. 2431, 2015 ONCJ 262 (Ont. C.J.).
89
Id., at paras. 9 and 11.
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accuracy of a particular reading, the Crown was being put to unnecessary
effort and expense.90
Gubbins and Vallentgoed were charged in separate proceedings under
the post-St-Onge Lamoureux regime. In each of these cases, printouts
generated at the time the tests were performed indicated that the breath
alcohol analyzers were functioning properly.91 Vallentgoed and Gubbins
sought disclosure of the maintenance records with respect to the relevant
breath alcohol analyzers, on the premise that these maintenance records
were relevant to the accuracy of the instruments. Gubbins and
Vallentgoed were tried separately, but the appeals were heard together.92
When the two cases were heard before the Alberta Court of Queen’s
Bench, Kenny J. criticized the Crown for continuing to resist first party
disclosure of maintenance logs in the wake of St-Onge Lamoureux. She
adopted the view expressed by McIntyre J. in R. v. Sinclair:
The Supreme Court of Canada has held these maintenance logs to be
relevant in R. v. St-Onge Lamoureux, 2012 SCC 57 (S.C.C.). There is
no room to argue they are not relevant. It is a waste of court time and
the accused’s money to fight preliminary battles of relevance of these
records.93

In the Alberta Court of Appeal, Slatter J.A. (Berger J.A. concurring)
reviewed the evidentiary record, including expert testimony given by
Ms. Kerry Blake. Blake is “a Forensic Alcohol Specialist [in the
Toxicology Service Program] with the [RCMP] National Centre for
Forensic Service Alberta”94 and a member of the ATC. Justice Slatter
also noted that Blake is a co-author of the ATC’s 2012 standards for
assessing the accuracy and reliability of breath alcohol analyzer results.95
He accepted Blake’s evidence that one “can form no conclusions
concerning the proper operation of an instrument based on maintenance
records. … [T]he only records that can establish proper operation at the
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time of testing are those … produced during testing itself.”96 Noting that
Blake’s evidence was uncontradicted at the disclosure hearing, Slatter
J.A. concluded that it follows from her evidence that maintenance
records for breath alcohol analyzers are “clearly irrelevant”97 and thus
not subject to first party disclosure.98 Turning to St-Onge Lamoureux,
Slatter J.A. held that this case “never categorically states that all
maintenance records are always disclosable.”99 In the result, Slatter J.A.
held that maintenance logs are not subject to first party disclosure and
that the “likely relevance” of these logs had not been established for third
party disclosure.
In the SCC, Rowe J. agreed that maintenance logs for breath alcohol
analyzers need not be disclosed pursuant to the first party disclosure
regime.100 Similarly, Gubbins and Vallentgoed had not discharged the
burden of demonstrating “likely relevance” for the purposes of the third
party disclosure process.101 Justice Rowe concluded that Deschamps J.’s
references to disclosure of maintenance records in St-Onge Lamoureux
did not establish the relevance of these records.102 He also pointed to a
change in the position taken by ATC with respect to the relevance of
maintenance logs.103 In St-Onge Lamoureux, Deschamps J. had observed:
... The expert evidence filed in the instant case reveals that the
possibility of an instrument malfunctioning or being used improperly
when breath samples are taken is not merely speculative, but is very
real. The [ATC] has made a series of recommendations concerning the
procedures to be followed by the professionals who operate the
instruments and verify that they are properly maintained. … According
to the Committee, the calibration and maintenance of instruments are
essential ‘to the integrity of the breath test program’.104

Justice Rowe explains in Gubbins that the ATC changed its position on
“the documentation required for assessing the accuracy and reliability of
approved instruments” after St-Onge Lamoureux was decided.105 He
96
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observes that this change in position “qualified” the evidence that was
before the Court in St-Onge Lamoureux, as the ATC now stipulates that
maintenance logs do not bear upon the accuracy of test results given by
breath alcohol analyzers in the field.106 Justice Rowe accepted Blake’s
evidence that false positive results are “highly unlikely” to occur and that
“maintenance records cannot tell us whether any particular result is a
false positive.”107 Accordingly, these records are “not obviously relevant”
to the breath alcohol analyzer’s functioning or proper operation at the
time of testing.108
Justice Côté expressed alarm at the majority’s approach. She observed
that the view expressed by the majority in St-Onge Lamoureux regarding
the relevance of maintenance records was based on a far more “detailed
and balanced” evidentiary record than that which was present in
Gubbins.109 Justice Côté regarded the expectation that maintenance
records would routinely be disclosed as central to the majority’s
reasoning in St-Onge Lamoureux.110 Furthermore, Côté J. noted that the
updated ATC position statement relied upon by the majority in Gubbins
“has not been shown to be the product of new scientific evidence of any
kind”.111
Ultimately, Côté J. cautioned:
Just as the courts subject experts to special scrutiny before allowing
them to opine on the ‘ultimate issue’ in a dispute, so should this Court
exercise caution, in this case, when considering the extent to which the
ATC’s updated recommendations are determinative of the relevance of
maintenance records, a question of law that is to be decided by the
courts. Such caution is particularly warranted in light of the ATC’s
composition... .112

Indeed, Côté J. noted, Blake herself had acknowledged in testimony in
other cases that not all experts agree with the ATC position on the
relevance of maintenance records.113
106
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In the end, however, Côté J.’s dissent stands as a lone voice of
caution. It remains open to a future litigant to amass an evidentiary
record that raises the “likely relevance” of maintenance logs to the
accuracy of approved breath alcohol analyzers in the context of an
application for third party disclosure. Unless (or until) that step is
successfully taken and a new evidentiary record prompts a change in the
present approach, maintenance logs will not form part of the standard
disclosure package in “Over 80” cases.

IV. CHARTER RIGHTS, STATE EXPERTISE
What happens when specialist knowledge generated to meet the needs
of coercive state institutions enters courtrooms as expert evidence? In the
absence of information to the contrary, courts tend to presume that such
specialist knowledge is neutral, well-grounded in research, and suitable
for judicial purposes. As the evidentiary records in Ewert and St-Onge
Lamoureux suggest, however, these presumptions may not withstand
careful scrutiny.
It took Ewert almost 20 years to establish that CSC was breaching its
statutory duty to Indigenous prisoners. Ewert’s victory was,
unquestionably, secured by the expert testimony of Dr. Stephen Hart, an
academic psychologist who has spent much of his career assessing the
validity of diagnostic and risk assessment techniques. It is sobering to
observe that, if Hart’s research had not been available, the State’s expert
evidence may well have gone unchallenged and the shortcomings of that
evidence would have been far more difficult to establish. Of course, the
State’s evidence would have been no more reliable in the absence of
Hart’s testimony — but it would most likely have been accepted.
State institutions have vastly greater resources at their disposal than
rights-holding litigants, including greater capacity to generate and use
specialist knowledge. As repeat players within Charter litigation and the
criminal legal system,114 state institutions have the capacity to be
strategic about which cases they pursue. When one conceives of state
institutions as repeat players, Côté J.’s dissent in Gubbins raises
disquieting questions. Her account of the scientific debate in St-Onge
Lamoureux suggests that the case-by-case obligation to establish an
evidentiary record enabled the Crown and ATC to persuade the Court to
114
Marc Galanter, “Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change” (1974) 9 Law & Society Review 95=160, at 98-104.
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alter the previous parameters of first party disclosure. As Côté J. points
out, the ATC was not obliged by the Court to identify any material
change in research or technology that would warrant its change in
position between St-Onge Lamoureux and Gubbins.
Recent SCC and appellate decisions have emphasized that trial judges
should play an active gatekeeping role with regard to expert evidence.115
In theory, the party who proffers expert evidence must prove that this
evidence is reliable for the purposes for which it is offered. Even where
this presumption is statutorily altered — as it has been for breath alcohol
analyzers — it remains possible to challenge scientific reliability.
However, across the criminal legal system, the reliability of the state’s
specialist knowledge is routinely taken for granted. Legal aid caps and
other resource constraints place very real limits on the capacity of rightsholding litigants to challenge routine, state-generated expert evidence.
Indeed, it is the very routine nature of some specialist knowledge
generated by the state — such as risk assessment tools and breath alcohol
analyzers — that may cause judges and lawyers to overlook the need for
vigilance with respect to all expert evidence, including that which has
effectively been grandfathered under our previous, more laissez-faire
approaches to admissibility.116
The evidentiary record in Ewert suggests that we may be too
complacent about the validity of the state’s routine forms of specialist
knowledge and about the independence of expert witnesses who, in many
cases, spend their careers working within state institutions. Justice Côté
argues that a similar lesson emerges from the evidentiary record in StOnge Lamoureux. When routine expert techniques are subjected to
careful scrutiny, troubling value judgments and blind spots can become
apparent. In a criminal legal system in which the over-representation of
Indigenous people and Black Canadians continues to grow and
Indigenous women are the fastest growing population of prisoners, it is
entirely possible that the unexamined reliance upon routine expert
techniques generated by and for coercive state ends perpetuates structural
racism and gendered harms. The record in Ewert gives real heft to that
concern.
115
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Read together, Ewert and Gubbins suggest that the practical value of
constitutional rights depends on maintaining a generous approach to
disclosure of information that bears upon the independence and
reliability of the state’s specialist knowledge. I was therefore pleased to
see that when the Ontario Court of Appeal recently considered Gubbins,
it held that a record of the performance of a drug recognition expert in
other cases was obviously relevant to the reliability of the expert’s
opinion in the instant case, and therefore subject to first party
disclosure.117
However, I am troubled that the SCC did not subject the testimony
given by the State’s expert witness in Gubbins to the careful judicial
evaluation that is anticipated within cases such as White Burgess Langille
Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co.118 and R. v. Sekhon.119 Blake’s
testimony was ipse dixit, drawing only on the authority of the ATC —
whose publications similarly fail to cite any scientific evidence for its
position. While Rowe J. is quite correct to point to the fact that Blake’s
evidence was not answered by an opposing expert, this observation does
not substitute for the careful assessment of reliability that should precede
any judicial reliance upon an expert’s testimony, particularly where the
scope of a constitutional right is in play. Indeed, given the imperative of
judicial independence from other branches of the state, the need for such
an assessment is heightened when liberty is at stake and the record is
confined to specialist knowledge generated by or for an arm of the
executive state.
Read together, Ewert and Gubbins also illustrate the very real equality
concerns that arise from the imbalance of state and rights claimants’
access to specialist knowledge. The Charter places the burden of proving
a breach of Charter rights upon the rights holder. The practical
significance of this burden of proof is vividly illustrated by Ewert.
Ewert’s case was essentially a challenge to the validity of tools largely
developed by CSC and State employees for the ends of coercive State
institutions. CSC was held to have breached its statutory duty to pursue
substantive equality by failing to take reasonable steps to ensure that
these tools are accurate with respect to Indigenous people, but not to
have breached Ewert’s section 15 Charter right to substantive equality.
Given this distinction, one wonders how a rights holder — in Ewert, an
117
118
119
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incarcerated Indigenous man — might ever generate the evidentiary
record that would positively establish that Indigenous offenders are
systematically over-classified using these tools. Not the least impediment
to such an undertaking arises from the structural control of information;
the information that would be required for such an analysis is largely
held and controlled by CSC.
The failure of section 15 litigation to advance substantive equality is
widely documented.120 However, the relationship between the
“primordial status of substantive equality”121 and access to justice is, as
Melina Buckley has observed, under-theorized within Canadian rights
jurisprudence.122 Ewert demonstrates some of the practical consequences
of the allocation of evidentiary and persuasive burdens for the
vindication of constitutional rights within a system of asymmetric and
heavily constrained resources. As Gubbins also illustrates, until Canadian
courts address these consequences, individual rights holders will
continue to face an uphill battle when seeking to challenge the state’s
specialist knowledge.
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